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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
There are two issues on appeal: 
1. Whether the District Court correctly interpreted the 
clear and unambiguous language of the Settlement Agreement 
("Agreement") between the parties relating to the assignment and 
release by the estate to "advances" and "repayment of 
interpartnership loans," together with the release by Southwest 
Virginia Shopping Center Associates ("Southwest") of the "claim for 
repayment of the interpartnership loans." 
2. Whether the District Court correctly awarded 
attorney fees as consequential damages in light of the express 
terms of the Agreement. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Myrne M. Collier, as personal representative of the 
Estate of James A. Collier, deceased ("The Estate"), assigned to 
Kerry M. Heinz ("Heinz") all of the Estate's rights to the 
"advances" of approximately $907,331.30, which advances were 
applied toward interpartnership loans and the Estate released all 
claims which it might otherwise have with respect to future 
repayment of the interpartnership loans. (Agreement, paragraph 5, 
R.100.) 
Southwest Virginia Shopping Center Associates 
("Southwest") dismissed its probate claims against the Estate 
-1-
(Agreement, paragraph 12), and released, acquitted and discharged 
all claims against the Estate. (Agreement, paragraph 10.) 
The Estate did retain its general partnership interest as 
well as its limited partnership interest in Southwest. (Agreement, 
paragraphs 2 and 3.) However, this retention does not allow for a 
"repayment of an interpartnership loan," which loan was released 
specifically in paragraph 5 of the Agreement, but is restricted to 
the "general partner distribution interest" and any distribution 
payable to a limited partner, exclusive of interpartnership loan 
repayment. (Agreement, paragraphs 2, 3 and 5.) 
Heinz and Southwest were initially contending the 
Agreement to be ineffective and not reflective of the parties' 
understanding. (Answer of Defendants.) However, in response to 
the Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment and Heinz's and 
Southwest's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Agreement was 
acknowledged as being effective and binding on the parties. The 
Affidavit of Semkin in support of Heinz's and Southwest's Motion 
for Summary Judgment tried to explain why the two positions, i.e., 
the Agreement was not reflective of the parties' understanding and 
why Heinz and Southwest later acknowledged the Agreement was 
binding. The Estate unjustly criticizes the Semkin Affidavit in 
the Respondent's Brief by taking the information of the two 
positions out of context. (Respondent's Brief, p. 9, 12 and 13.) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FULL DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE DOES NOT 
INCLUDE THE RELEASED INTERPARTNERSHIP LOAN. 
In paragraph 8 of the Agreement, the Estate did reserve 
its distributive share under paragraphs 2 and 3 from the general 
release of all claims. However, that reservation did not add back 
the released future interpartnership loan repayments. Under 
paragraph 5, the Estate assigned the "advances" and "released any 
right to any future interpartnership loan repayments." The 
language is clear, concise and unambiguous. It provides in 
pertinent part: 
The Estate hereby assigns, transfers and 
conveys to Heinz all of the Estate's rights, 
if any, to recover any part or all of the 
amounts advanced by it to be applied toward 
Interpartnership Loans, and the Estate hereby 
releases any and all claims which it might 
otherwise have with respect to the future 
repayment, if any, of the Interpartnership 
Loans• 
The Estate in Respondent's Brief asserts: 
Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, the 
Estate released any and all claims it had with 
respect to future repayment of the 
Interpartnership Loans, i.e., the right to 
recover the $907,331.30 the Estate had 
advanced. (Page 8 of Respondent's Brief.) 
That statement is a deliberate obfuscation of the clear language of 
paragraph 5. The Estate seems willing to concede it is not 
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entitled to the "advances," but addresses the question as if the 
advances is the interpartnership loan repayment. THE 
INTERPARTNERSHIP LOAN REPAYMENT IS DIFFERENT THAN ADVANCES. The 
Estate's assertion at page 8 of the Respondent's Brief is correct 
as a matter of law and contract interpretation, except when the 
Estate asserts the "advances" is the "future repayment of 
interpartnership loans." An examination of the provisions of 
paragraph 5 clearly dispel any doubt that the advances of 
$907,331.30 by the Estate and a similar amount from Heinz were used 
to apply toward certain interpartnership loans by the following 
clear language: 
The Estate and Heinz have advanced large sums 
of money which have been applied toward 
certain Interpartnership Loans. The amounts 
so advanced by the Estate total approximately 
$907,331.30. 
It is true that the "advances" and "interpartnership loans" both 
appear in paragraph 5. However, it is very clear that the advances 
are not future repayments of the interpartnership loans by the 
following language: 
There have been loans made by and between some 
or all of the Limited Partnerships (the so-
called "Interpartnership Loans"), including, 
without limitation, loans made through the so-
called CHA Trust or through CHA to the extent 
any part of the funds for such loans came from 
Limited Partnerships. The Estate and Heinz 
have advanced large sums of money which have 
been applied toward certain Interpartnership 
Loans. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Paragraph 5 goes on to provide that no advances have been made by 
either party (the Estate and Heinz) for a period in excess of four 
years, and that no repayment of advances have been made. Also, 
that there may be theories upon which recovery could be claimed or 
asserted for repayment of the advances. Then, in clear and 
unambiguous language, the Estate: 
"... hereby assigns, transfers and conveys . 
. . the Estate's rights . . . to recover . . . 
the amounts advanced by it . . . applied 
toward Interpartnership Loans, and the Estate 
hereby releases 
. . . all claims . . . to the future repayment 
of the Interpartnership Loans. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
Advances are earlier payments (some four years old) applied to 
interpartnership loans. Interpartnership loans are existing loans 
to the various partnerships. Some partnerships are creditor 
partnerships and some are debtor partnerships. However, the Estate 
released any claim to any repayment of interpartnership loans. 
The Estate simply wanted nothing further to do with 
interpartnership loans, either by way of repayment or any liability 
to pay any part thereof to the partnerships. To this end, the 
Agreement provides: 
In consideration therefor [the assignment of 
advances and release of future repayment of 
the Interpartnership Loans, if any,] and in 
consideration of other benefits to Heinz under 
this Agreement, Heinz hereby agrees to 
indemnify and hold harmless the Estate from 
any and all claims, liabilities, causes of 
action, demands, damages, costs and expenses 
of any kind, whether known or unknown, fixed 
or contingent, which may be asserted against 
the Estate and which arise out of or are in 
any way connected with Interpartnership Loans. 
Heinz, therefore, was the beneficiary of the release of any future 
repayment of interpartnership loan or loans. The Estate had no 
further interest in the "advances" or the future repayment of 
interpartnership loans. 
POINT II 
THE ESTATE ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IS ONLY ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF ALLOWED BY LAW. 
In the Court below, it was argued that the Estate had 
released to Heinz any future repayment of interpartnership loans. 
(See R. 326, Transcript 26-34, 48 and 49.) The Estate is 
inaccurate when it asserts in the Respondent's Brief at page 27: 
Defendants attempt to raise for the first time 
on appeal a claim that the Estate was 
"overpaid" its limited partner distribution in 
the amount of $4,257.04 because that sum has 
as its source the repayment of the 
Interpartnership Loan to Southwest Virginia. 
Defendants did not raise this issue in their 
pleadings or argument before the district 
court. All argument raised and presented by 
defendants below concerned only the 
distributive share the Estate was entitled to 
receive as a general partner of Southwest 
Virginia. 
The release of any future repayment of interpartnership loans 
includes the release as a limited partner. It is from this source 
that the overpayment results. 
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No court is allowed to grant relief beyond that which a 
party is entitled under a Motion for Summary Judgment. No evidence 
was taken and the relief to which the Estate was entitled is: 
a) The Estate's distributive general partner share 
less any repayment of interpartnership loans; 
b) The Estate's distributive limited partner share 
less any repayment of interpartnership loans. 
Those amounts are: 
Net amount from sale of assets: $1,429,000 
$556,732.00 (To be divided 40% to general 
partners, 60% to limited partners) 
$ 872,268.00 (Return of capital to limited partners) 
Division of net sale proceeds: 
General Partners (40%) Limited Partners 
Heinz The Estate 
$ 111,346.40 $ 111,346.40 $ 872,268.00 
334,039.20 (60%) 
$1,206,307.20 
Amounts Due to the Estate: 
General Partner's Share Limited Partner's Share 
(3.66%) 
$ 111,346.40 $ 44,150.84 
Amounts Actually Paid: 
General Partner's Share 
$ 53,080.11 $ 48,415.44 
58,266.29 $ 111 34 40
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Overpayment: 
General Partner's Share Limited Partner's Share 
None $ 4,264.60 
Net Due to Heinz: $ 4,264.60 
Heinz and Southwest simply paid part of the judgment of the lower 
court and deposited funds in an interest bearing account in lieu of 
a supersedeas bond and appealed from the trial court's Judgment. 
The fact that Heinz and Southwest overpaid a portion of the 
Judgment does not give the Estate the right to assert in this Court 
an improper amount when the basis of the entire Judgment is and has 
been challenged. 
POINT III 
THE AWARDING OF ATTORNEY FEES 
IS TANTAMOUNT TO REWRITING THE AGREEMENT. 
The holding by the lower court simply puts attorney's 
fees as a consequential damage in every contract action. The 
intent of the parties is clearly enunciated by the very provisions 
of the Agreement. Those provisions are controlling as they express 
the intent of the parties. The intent of the parties is that no 
one is entitled to attorney fees in the event of a breach. Canyon 
Country Store v. Bracev, 781 P.2d 414 (Ut. 1989) is not applicable 
in this instance because the contract in Canyon, supra, involved an 
insurance contract, in which the insured really had limited input# 
while in this instance both parties had input, many drafts were 
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submitted and changes made, and the Agreement is the culmination 
and expression of the parties' intent. 
The parties did provide for remedies in the event of 
default of the Agreement, see paragraphs 16 and 17. The terms of 
the Agreement are contractual and not merely recitals. The parties 
then acknowledged: 
The parties acknowledge, declare and agree 
that the terms of this Agreement have been 
read by them and are fully understood and 
voluntarily accepted for the purpose of making 
a full, final and complete compromise, 
adjustment and settlement of any and all 
transactions, agreements, courses of dealings 
which may have arisen or may arise, all under 
the terms and conditions expressly contained 
herein, and that this Agreement is entered 
into for the sake of buying peace and avoiding 
protracted and lengthy further efforts to 
resolve disputes among the parties. (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
No clearer expression need be made to defeat any awarding of 
attorney fees to any of the parties to the Agreement to allow an 
award of fees simply rewrites the contract, which the courts are 
not at liberty to do under the guise of interpretation. See Barker 
v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Ut. 1987). The inclusion of the term 
"may arise" gives prospective application to the terms of the 
Agreement. The Agreement specifically declined to include an award 
for attorney fees. 
Finally, if the Estate's position is adhered to, it would 
allow a party and his counsel to agree to outrageous fees on the 
basis that the award of fees "must be based on the prevailing 
party's actual losses, i.e., its out-of-pocket expenses for legal 
counsel." (Canyon, supra, p.420.) 
Damages, even consequential damages, are subject to 
mitigation and reasonableness. The Trial Court was not impressed 
with the "reasonableness" of fees and expressed concern. To award 
$18,597.00 fees for a matter which did not go to trial, but was 
determined by cross-motions for summary judgment is not reasonable. 
To award additional fees of over $7,000 to argue the consequential 
damage issue and update the fees is evidence of unreasonableness. 
This Court should strike all fees in conformity with the 
express terms and provisions of the Agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
Heinz and Southwest are entitled to the following relief: 
a) A correct interpretation of the Agreement granting 
to Heinz the assignment and release of the advances and any future 
repayment of interpartnership loans; 
b) The Judgment of November 21, 1989, be reversed and 
set aside; 
c) For judgment against the Estate for $4,264.60 plus 
interest from and after November 27, 1989, until paid; 
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d) An order reversing and vacating the Judgment for 
attorney fees of $18,579 dated May 22, 1990, said judgment being 
contrary to the terms of the Agreement. 
e) For costs of this appeal. 
DATED this the 31st day of 
~~ ^ DUNN 
Defendants 
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